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OPINION 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
The question presented in this appeal is whether an arbitration award is so 
untethered from the facts and underlying agreements as to be “irrational.”  The arbitration 
award requires Cheryl Schwarzwaelder to repay a loan given to her by her former 
employer, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., when she first joined the 
company.  Schwarzwaelder argues that she is entitled to other compensation from Merrill 
Lynch in an amount that would offset her loan repayment obligation.  The arbitrators 
decided that Schwarzwaelder had released her claim to this other compensation in a 
settlement agreement in related litigation between the same parties.  We find that the 
arbitrators‟ decision is not irrational.  Therefore, we hold that the arbitration award must 
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be confirmed.  Accordingly, the District Court decision vacating the arbitration award in 
favor of Merrill Lynch will be reversed. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
A. Schwarzwaelder’s Compensation Package 
Schwarzwaelder joined Merrill Lynch as a financial advisor in the company‟s 
Pittsburgh offices in 2002.  One aspect of her initial compensation arrangement is central 
to this appeal.  Under her written employment agreement, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay 
Schwarzwaelder “monthly transition compensation payments” of $16,687.15 from March 
2003 to November 2007.  (A. 295-96.)  In a separate promissory note, Merrill Lynch 
loaned Schwarzwaelder $850,000, which she agreed to repay with interest in monthly 
installments of $16,687.15 from March 2003 to November 2007.  Thus, 
Schwarzwaelder‟s obligation to repay the loan would be matched each month by a 
payment of transition compensation.  The compensation arrangement also included a 
provision for acceleration of the transition compensation payments in the event that 
Schwarzwaelder became disabled.  Specifically, the parties‟ agreement provided that, in 
the event she became disabled, Schwarzwaelder was to receive “a lump sum payment 
equal to the remaining transition compensation payments through November 2007.”  (A. 
296.) 
B. Schwarzwaelder’s Disability Claim 
 In November 2003, Schwarzwaelder ceased work and applied for benefits under 
Merrill Lynch‟s long-term disability benefit plan.  Her claim was denied, and she brought 
suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1001 et seq.  Ultimately, after a remand to the claims administrator, the District Court 
determined that Schwarzwaelder was disabled within the meaning of the plan.  
Schwarzwaelder v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558-70 (W.D. Pa. 2009).   
 Merrill Lynch appealed to this court.  While the appeal was pending, the parties 
settled the ERISA litigation.  The settlement was memorialized in an agreement and 
release executed on November 25, 2009.  Of central importance to this case is the fact 
that, with the exception of certain specifically identified claims brought by 
Schwarzwaelder and Merrill Lynch against each other in an arbitration proceeding before 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the parties released each other 
from all claims or liabilities “arising out of, or relating to, [Schwarzwaelder]‟s 
employment or termination of employment.”  (A. 389.)  Specifically, the release executed 
as part of the ERISA settlement provided:   
Nothing in . . . this Agreement shall prohibit or restrict the parties from 
prosecuting or defending the following claims before the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”): Schwarzwaelder‟s claim for two asset 
bonuses pursuant to the terms of her hiring Agreement; Schwarzwaelder‟s 
claim for payment under Merrill Lynch‟s Financial Advisor Capital 
Accumulation Award Plan pursuant to the terms of her hiring Agreement; 
Schwarzwaelder‟s claim for payment under Merrill Lynch‟s Short Term 
Deferred Contingent Award Plan pursuant to the terms of her hiring 
Agreement; Schwarzwaelder‟s claim for a referral fee in connection with 
Merrill Lynch‟s hire of Mr. Smith, an investment banker; 
Schwarzwaelder‟s potential claims (claims not yet filed in the pending 
FINRA proceeding) under common law theories of civil conspiracy, fraud, 
and tortious interference relating to the circumstances of the denial of her 
benefits and to her separation from Merrill Lynch; and Merrill Lynch‟s 
claim for payment pursuant to the terms of Schwarzwaelder‟s Promissory 
Note (“FINRA claims”).   
 
(A. 389-90.)   
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 The final item from that list is pertinent here: the ERISA settlement permitted 
Merrill Lynch to arbitrate a claim for repayment of the $850,000 promissory note.  
Notably, the release is silent on the matter of the monthly transition compensation 
payments of $16,687.15.  Nor did the release mention any claim to entitlement to a lump 
sum payment equal to the remaining transition compensation payments based upon 
Schwarzwaelder‟s alleged disability. 
C. The FINRA Arbitration  
The FINRA arbitration had begun in April 2004.  Prior to the ERISA settlement, 
Merrill Lynch asserted in the arbitration that it was owed nearly $700,000 in unpaid 
principal on the promissory note.  Schwarzwaelder believed that Merrill Lynch‟s 
arbitration claim for payment on the promissory note depended upon the outcome of the 
ERISA litigation.  As noted above, under her employment agreement, if Schwarzwaelder 
became disabled—a determination she sought in the ERISA litigation—then her 
transition compensation payments would be accelerated: in lieu of monthly payments, 
Schwarzwaelder was entitled to receive “a lump sum payment equal to the remaining 
transition compensation payments through November 2007.”  (A. 296.)  In May 2005, the 
parties jointly stipulated to a stay of the arbitration pending the resolution of the ERISA 
litigation. 
After the ERISA litigation was resolved by settlement in November 2009, 
Schwarzwaelder re-opened the arbitration.  Her amended arbitration complaint did not 
request a lump sum payment of the transition compensation.  Merrill Lynch submitted a 
counterclaim for payment of the unpaid balance on the promissory note.  Schwarzwaelder 
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maintained that her obligation to repay the note was offset, dollar-for-dollar, by her 
entitlement to a lump sum payment of transition compensation upon being found to be 
disabled in the ERISA litigation.  Although she had not affirmatively sought payment of 
this lump sum amount, she argued that she could rely on it as a form of defense to Merrill 
Lynch‟s claim. 
A panel of arbitrators held a hearing in the matter in December 2010 and issued a 
written decision on January 6, 2011.  The arbitrators accepted the finding of the District 
Court in the ERISA litigation that Schwarzwaelder had become disabled, but they 
nevertheless held that any entitlement Schwarzwaelder may have had to a lump sum 
payment of transition compensation was released in the ERISA settlement.  The 
arbitration award explained: 
Not only did [Schwarzwaelder] fail to make a claim for monthly transition 
compensation payments in her action before FINRA, although she made 
other compensation claims, the Panel finds that any such claim was waived 
by the terms of the Settlement and Release dated 11/25/09, since the 
monthly transition compensation payments were not an excepted claim.  
 
(A. 261.) 
After adjusting for awards on claims presented by Schwarzwaelder, the arbitrators 
entered an award in favor of Merrill Lynch in the amount of $544,244.   
D. District Court Review of the Arbitration Award 
 Merrill Lynch commenced an action in the District Court for confirmation of the 
arbitration award as permitted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9.  
Schwarzwaelder applied to the same Court for an order vacating the arbitration award, 
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arguing that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(4) by issuing an irrational decision.  The two proceedings were consolidated.   
 The District Court denied Merrill Lynch‟s application, granted Schwarzwaelder‟s 
application, and vacated the arbitration award.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Inc. v. Schwarzwaelder, Civ. No. 2:11-107, 2011 WL 1882450, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 
2011).  The District Court held that the arbitrators had “exceeded their powers” by 
irrationally construing the parties‟ arrangements.  The District Court reasoned that the 
promissory note and the employment agreement “[w]hen read together . . . created a 
forgivable loan” and “[t]he assertion that a loan has been forgiven is routinely viewed as 
a defense . . . , not a claim that must be plead[ed] separately.”  Id. at *3-4; see also id. at 
*5 (remanding to the arbitrators to calculate lump sum payment of transition 
compensation).  Merrill Lynch appealed the District Court‟s order to this court. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the parties‟ applications to confirm or 
vacate the arbitration award because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); cf. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (explaining that Federal Arbitration 
Act “does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction”).  As to our 
jurisdiction, the Federal Arbitration Act permits us to hear an appeal from an order 
“confirming or denying confirmation of an award” or “vacating an award.”  9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(D), (E).  The fact that the District Court also ordered that the matter be 
remanded to the arbitrators does not impair our jurisdiction, because we may entertain an 
8 
 
appeal even when the district court‟s order contemplates further arbitration proceedings.  
See V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 913-14 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding that order vacating arbitration award and remanding for “re-evaluation of 
the entire controversy” was an appealable final order); see also Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. 
Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 328 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]n order of the district court which vacates 
and remands an arbitral award is not thus made an interlocutory order.”).   
The District Court‟s order vacating the arbitration award is subject to ordinary 
principles of appellate review.  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-
48 (1995).  Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo.  Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 
Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010).  In the present case, the District Court 
made no findings of fact, and our review is plenary.  We apply the same legal standard 
under the Federal Arbitration Act that the District Court applied.  Metromedia Energy, 
Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III. Discussion 
 The sole ground advanced by Schwarzwaelder for vacating the arbitration award is 
that “the arbitrators exceeded their powers” by concluding that the release executed as 
part of the ERISA settlement barred her from claiming an offset to her liability on the 
promissory note in the amount of unpaid transition compensation payments.
1
  Arbitrators 
exceed their powers when they fashion an award that cannot “be rationally derived from 
                                              
1
 Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a court to set aside an 
arbitration “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
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the agreement between the parties or from the parties‟ submissions to the arbitrators” or 
when the terms of the arbitration award itself “are completely irrational.”  Ario, 618 F.3d 
at 295 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  An arbitration award is not 
rationally derived from the agreement of the parties only when there is “absolutely no 
support at all in the record justifying the arbitrators‟ determinations.”  Id.; see also 
Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (asking 
“whether the arbitrator‟s conclusion is supported, in any way, by a rational interpretation 
of the collective bargaining agreement”). 
This is a “singularly undemanding” standard.  Ario,618 F.3d at 296 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Although we will not “„rubber stamp‟ the 
interpretations and decisions of arbitrators,” Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 
113 (3d Cir. 1996), we nevertheless afford arbitration awards “a strong presumption of 
correctness.” Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 
F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2004).  The parties to an arbitration agreement have bargained for 
their dispute to be resolved by the arbitrators rather than by the courts.  Id.  The role of 
the courts is to ask only “whether the parties . . . got what they bargained for, namely an 
arbitrator who would first provide an interpretation of the contract that was rationally 
based on the language of the agreement, and second would produce a rational award.”  
Brentwood Med. Assocs., 396 F.3d at 242. 
In this case, the arbitrators construed the ERISA settlement to mean that 
Schwarzwaelder released any claim she may otherwise have had to a lump sum payment 
of transition compensation under her employment agreement.  A straightforward reading 
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of the ERISA settlement provides at least some support for that conclusion.  The ERISA 
settlement identifies six specific claims or sets of claims that the parties agreed to allow 
to go forward in arbitration.  Schwarzwaelder‟s claim for transition compensation is not 
among them.   
To avoid this result, Schwarzwaelder relies on one principal counterargument: the 
ERISA settlement preserves Schwarzwaelder‟s right to raise defenses to Merrill Lynch‟s 
claim for the unpaid balance of the promissory note.  Schwarzwaelder contends that the 
transition compensation payments were intended as a form of loan forgiveness; that loan 
forgiveness is a defense; and that she is therefore entitled to rely on the transition 
compensation as a defense to Merrill Lynch‟s claim.  She argues that the arbitrators‟ 
rejection of this theory rested on an irrational separation of the promissory note and the 
employment agreement.  
According to Schwarzwaelder, a forgivable loan is a common compensation 
device within the securities industry.  See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 
349 (8th Cir. 1995) (loan of $100,933 forgiven over three years in equal annual 
installments); Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(loan of $520,488 forgiven over six years).  Often the terms of the loan explicitly 
contemplate forgiveness.  But Schwarzwaelder also offers instances of compensation 
arrangements more akin to the facts of this case, where the promissory note is paired with 
equal and offsetting compensation.  See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 847 F.2d 
631, 632 (10th Cir. 1988) (promissory note for $60,000 loan and employment agreement 
provision for bonus of $60,000 to be paid in future yearly installments, with employer 
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reserving right to apply bonus to loan repayment); Banus v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 
Civ. No. 98-7128, 2010 WL 1643780, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010) (promissory note 
requiring repayment in seven equal annual installments, paired with “special 
compensation” payments in same amount over same time); In re Killian, 422 B.R. 903, 
907 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2009) (similar).   
The parties‟ two agreements in the present case appear to have been drafted to fit 
together.  The monthly transition compensation payments in the employment agreement 
and the schedule of loan repayments in the promissory note are identical in amount and 
duration—offsetting payments of $16,687.15 every month from March 2003 to 
November 2007.  While the two agreements do not explicitly refer to each other, the 
promissory note states that the sum of $16,687.15 will be deducted each month from 
Schwarzwaelder‟s total “compensation,” which is defined in the promissory note to 
include “transition compensation.”  (A. 305.)  Similarly, the employment agreement 
states that if Schwarzwaelder is disabled, the transition compensation will be paid in a 
lump sum “less any outstanding debts Schwarzwaelder owes to Merrill Lynch.”  (A. 
296.)  
Thus, we acknowledge that there is a basis in the record to construe the parties‟ 
agreements as intending to effect a single transaction akin to a forgivable loan.  But the 
question before us is whether Schwarzwaelder‟s favored construction is so overwhelming 
that the arbitrators‟ contrary reading was irrational.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Ario, 618 F.3d 
at 295.  It was not.   
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There are three significant factors that lend support to the arbitrators‟ decision.  
First, neither the promissory note nor the employment agreement describes the parties‟ 
arrangement as a form of loan forgiveness.  Under the terms of the promissory note, 
Schwarzwaelder agreed to repay the loan “unconditionally”—i.e., without regard to any 
offsetting payment of transition compensation.   (A. 305.)  Although the promissory note 
contemplates that repayments will be deducted from Schwarzwaelder‟s “transition 
compensation,” the note provides that repayments may also be deducted from other forms 
of compensation.  (A. 305.)  Second, the employment agreement makes no mention of the 
promissory note and does not require that the monthly transition compensation be used 
for debt repayment.  Finally, the release in the ERISA case explicitly enumerated a 
number of preserved claims for compensation without mentioning transition 
compensation, even though Merrill Lynch‟s demand for repayment of the promissory 
note was outstanding at the time of the ERISA settlement and the parties had agreed to 
stay the arbitration proceedings because the outcome of the ERISA litigation could 
trigger an entitlement on the part of Schwarzwaelder to transition compensation.  
Schwarzwaelder‟s defense to repayment of the promissory note is entirely dependent 
upon the existence of a claim to transition compensation, and she relinquished that claim 
in the release.   
Given these factors, we find that the arbitrators‟ decision can be rationally derived 
from the parties‟ agreements and submissions to the panel.  Even if the decision is open 
to criticism, “we may not overrule an arbitrator simply because [we] disagree.”  Ario, 618 
F.3d at 295 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Patten v. 
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Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n arbitration award 
does not fail to draw its essence from the agreement merely because a court concludes 
that an arbitrator has misread the contract.”).   
It is hard to see why Schwarzwaelder would have given up her claim for a lump 
sum payment of transition compensation in the ERISA settlement, while preserving 
numerous other claims for arbitration.  But why she would have placed such great stock 
in her right to “defend” Merrill Lynch‟s claim—rather than specifying that she could seek 
a lump sum payment of transition compensation—is equally a mystery.  Perhaps both 
sides favored some ambiguity in the language of the settlement.  Perhaps oversight or 
neglect played a role.  Or perhaps a release of the claim to transition compensation was 
part of the bargained-for exchange to settle the ERISA case.  All that must be said for the 
purposes of resolving this appeal is that the arbitrators‟ decision—in the face of the 
ERISA settlement, the promissory note, and the employment agreement—was not 
irrational. 
IV. Conclusion 
We have concluded that the FINRA arbitrators did not exceed their powers within 
the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).  Schwarzwaelder 
proffers no other reason on appeal to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award.  
Accordingly, the award must be confirmed.  Id. § 9.  We will remand the case to the 
District Court for the entry of an appropriate order. 
